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                                                     Adedokun Olatokunbo Ogunfolu  
                       A Legal Appraisal of the West African Free Trade Area  
Introduction 
African countries after independence in the latter half of the twentieth century embraced 
the formation of Free Trade Areas (FTAs), provided for under Article XXIV of the General 
Agreement on Trade and Tariffs (GATT 1947), as an exception to Article I Most Favored Nation 
(MFN) clause. FTAs were the adopted anodyne to reverse systemic underdevelopment wrought 
by departing colonialists from Europe and the emergence of the European Union. 1 Sub-Saharan 
Africa encompasses West Africa, and accounted for 1.1 per cent of world trade in 1991.2 West 
African share of world exports with the exception of Nigeria fell from 1.6% in 1980 to 0.6 per 
cent in 2006.3 In 1963 Africa’s share of world exports was 5.7 per cent and imports accounted 
for 5.2 per cent, while in 2006 Africa’s share of exports had declined to 3.1 per cent and imports 
2.4 per cent. 4            
 The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS)5 FTA is relatively 
unknown in the United States, unlike the   North American Free Trade Area (NAFTA), which 
came into effect on January 1, 1994.6 ECOWAS is a model FTA on the successful abolition of 
                                                            
1 Jon H. Sylvester, Sub‐Saharan Africa: Economic Stagnation, Political Disintegration, and the Specter of 
Recolonization, 27 Loy. L.A.L. Rev.  1299 at 1321, (1993‐1994). 
2 Id. at 1321. 
3 Africa and World Trade: Sub‐Saharan Africa’s  falling share of world trade, European Centre for International 
Political Economy, (ECIPE) Media Briefing Note 1/2007,  http://www.ecipe.org/press/Briefing%20note%20‐
%20Africa%20and%20world%20trade.pdf (Last visited Feb. 22, 2009) 
4 Id. 2. 
5 Kofi Oteng Kufour, Public Choice Theory and the Failure of the ECOWAS Trade Liberalization Scheme,23(4) World 
Competition, 137‐154(2000).  
6 Claude E. Barfield, Regionalism and US Trade Policy, in The Economics of Preferential Trade Agreements 136‐
159(Jagdish Bhagwati and Arvind Panagariya eds., 1996). 
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visas amongst its members.7 A brief history of western dominated international trade regime is 
necessary, in order to understand why West African countries’ attempts to form a customs union 
resulted into a free trade area.          
 This paper analyzes the debate whether FTAs create trade or distort trade, and examines 
the arguments around their role in facilitating the growth pace of developing countries. The 
impact of the World Trade Organization (WTO) on developing countries is analyzed through the 
prism of the constructive school of international relations, and the normative constructs of the 
realist school. The paper appraises the international economic law regime, through the 
establishment of ECOWAS in 1975 by fifteen contiguous states in West Africa, to promote inter-
regional trade and remove all barriers to labor, capital and ultimately establish a single currency 
for its fifteen countries. A critical legal analysis is carried out on the implementation of the goals 
of ECOWAS, and the modification of its treaty through additional protocols; to guarantee, peace, 
security and democracy in West Africa as a sine qua non for engaging the global economic 
community in a symbiotic relationship.         
  The paper concludes that ECOWAS has achieved peace and democracy in West 
Africa, despite limited resources, but its percentage share of world trade fell from 1.6 per cent in 
1980 to 0.6 per cent in 2006, excluding oil exporting members. The paper observes that 
ECOWAS has a lot of homework to do in lowering rules of origin requirements for goods 
manufactured in its member countries, provision of public infrastructure, enabling access to 
credit by entrepreneurs, in order to promote regional trade and access to the global economy.         
 
                                                            
7 Jean‐Christophe Maur, Regionalism and Trade Facilitation: A Primer, 42, no.6 Journal of World Trade 
979,993(2008). 
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I. Historical Background of FTAs 
The lessons learnt by the United States from the most protectionist law in American trade 
history, the Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act of 1930, led to the Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act 
(RTAA) of 1934 crafted by Cordell Hull’s attempt to promote free trade.8 It was imperative that 
American “beggar-my-neighbor”9 trade policies had to be reversed. This was the driving 
philosophy of the International Trade Organization (ITO) promoted by the United States to 
prevent another world war like the Second World War which the Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act had 
inadvertently caused.10 The United States attempted to globalize the RTAA under a multilateral 
system like the Breton Woods institutions of the World Bank and the International Monetary 
Fund, created out of a compromise between the American Dollar and British Pound supported by 
gold reserves.11            
 In negotiations over the ITO, Britain and the United States failed to reach a compromise 
over trade preferences established by Britain throughout the Commonwealth.12 
 One of the prime post World War II objectives of the United States was the dismantling 
of trade preferences especially the Commonwealth system…The United States’ preoccupation 
with Commonwealth preferences was so intense that an administrative spokesman told Congress 
in 1947 that eliminating these preferences was almost a sine qua non of success at the Geneva 
Conference. Failure to achieve this result has been blamed as one of the causes for the failure of 
the United States to accept the Havana Charter, thus causing the ITO to fail to materialize  13  
           
What emerged from the ITO was the accidental birth14 of a side agreement, the General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). “The Geneva negotiations of 1947 set the precedent 
                                                            
8 John H. Jackson, World Trade and the Law of GATT 251 (1969). 
9 Id. at 9. 
10 Joan E. Spero and Jeffrey A. Hart, The Politics of International Economic Relations, 50‐51 (1997). 
11 Id. at 51. 
12 Id. at 51. 
13 See Jackson, supra note 8, at 251. 
14 Andreas F. Lowenfeld, International Economic Law 25 (2008). 
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for subsequent ‘Rounds’-eight in all throughout the life of the GATT as an organization- that 
played a major part in the development of international trade law in the second half of the 
twentieth century.”15Brazil, Burma, Ceylon, Chile, Cuba, India, Lebanon, Pakistan, Southern 
Rhodesia and Syria were foundation members of GATT from the developing world. Southern 
Rhodesia was still a colony which attained independence in 1980 as Zimbabwe.   
  Customs unions (CUs)16 and free trade areas (FTAs)17 are exceptions to the Most 
Favored Nation (MFN)18 concept of the WTO GATT Article I.  A CU is difficult to attain; hence 
the European Union19 stands out as one of the rare examples of a successful CU.20 A CU 
requires all its members to adopt the same tariff against countries outside their union, while FTA 
members retain external tariffs against third countries and both CU and FTAs must eliminate 
duties and other restrictive regulations of commerce on substantially all the trade amongst its 
members. Substantially all the trade has not been defined by either a Panel or Appellate Body of 
the WTO.21 The Panel in the Turkey-Textiles case had assumed Turkey was in a customs union 
with the European Community and the Appellate Body held that the issue of whether Turkey met 
the requirements of paragraphs 8(a) and 5(a) of Article XXIV of GATT 1994 was not before it.22 
                                                            
15 Id. at 27. 
16 See the seminal work of Jacob Viner, The Customs Union Issue 41‐108 (1950).   
17 Anne O. Kruger Free Trade Agreements as Protectionist Devices: Rules of Origin, in The WTO and Reciprocal 
Preferential Trading Agreements 511 (Caroline Freund ed., 2007).  
18 Jacob Viner, The Most Favored Clause in American Commercial Treaties, 32 The Journal of Political Economy101‐
129 (Feb. 1924).  
19 The European Union was primarily created  to put a stop to bloody wars between neighbours which climaxed in 
World War II, http://europa.eu/abc/history/index_en.htm (last visited Feb. 3, 2009); Gerhard Loibl, International 
Economic Law, in International Law, 689, 714‐715 (Malcolm D. Evans ed., 2006). 
20 The oldest customs union is the South African Customs Union (SACU) established in 1910 and presently 
comprises of Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia, South Africa and Swaziland, http://www.sacu.int/ (last visited Feb. 3, 
2009).   
21 Editorial Board, The WTO Doha Round and Regionalism, 35, no.4 Legal Issues of Economic Integration, 297,298 
(2008). 
22 TURKEY‐RESTRICTIONS ON IMPORTS OF TEXTILES AND CLOTHING PRODUCTS WT/DS34/AB/R, October 22,1999, 
Paragraph 60 Appellate Body, see full text at:  
http://docsonline.wto.org/GEN_highLightParent.asp?qu=%28%40meta%5FSymbol+WT%FCDS34%FCAB%FCR%2A+
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             “The 
2007 dispute panel of Brazil-Retreaded Tyres came as close as yet seen to tackling this issue 
head-on.”23 The Panel had ruled that a Brazilian export ban on retreaded tyres was inconsistent 
with GATT Article XX:I and unjustifiable under Article XX(b) decided to exercise judicial 
economy in respect of the European Communities’ separate claims which included non 
compliance with the requirements of Article XXIV  of GATT 1994.24The Appellate body also 
decided to exercise judicial economy on making a pronouncement on the substantially all the 
trade requirements of Article XXIV,25 and upheld the Panel findings on Article XX, but for the 
different reason that Brazil contravened the Chapeau of Article XX.26        
     The debate revolves around whether FTAS are building blocks or stumbling blocks 
within the multilateral trade regime of the WTO, or termites in the trading system.27  Professor 
Bhagwati has asserted that “FTAs are two faced: they free trade among members, but they 
increase protection against nonmembers”.28An FTA must not impose higher duties than what 
existed in the FTA members’ territories prior to the formation of the FTA. Trade creation effects 
of FTAs, should in theory, outweigh the loss of trade by third countries. “Regionalization of 
trade factors heavily into sustainable economic growth”,29which  has been demonstrated by the 
European Union and NAFTA.        
                                                                                                                                                                                               
and+not+RW%2A%29&doc=D%3A%2FDDFDOCUMENTS%2FT%2FWT%2FDS%2F34ABR%2EDOC%2EHTM&curdoc=3
&popTitle=WT%2FDS34%2FAB%2FR (Last visited Mar.22, 2009).  
23 See footnote 21 above at 28.  
24 BRAZIL‐MEASURES AFFECTING IMPORTS OF RETREADED  TYRES WT/DS332/AB/R, December 3, 2007, Paragraph 
254 Appellate Body,  see full text at: 
http://docsonline.wto.org/GEN_highLightParent.asp?qu=%28%40meta%5FSymbol+WT%FCDS332%FCAB%FCR%2A
+and+not+RW%2A%29&doc=D%3A%2FDDFDOCUMENTS%2FT%2FWT%2FDS%2F332ABR%2EDOC%2EHTM&curdoc
=3&popTitle=WT%2FDS332%2FAB%2FR  (Last visited Mar.22, 2009).  
25 Id. at Paragraph 256.  
26 Id. at Paragraph 258 (b) (ii).  
27 Jagdish Bhagwati, Termites in the Trading System: How Preferential Agreements Undermine Free Trade (2008). 
28 Id. at 17. 
29 Chantal Thomas, Poverty Reduction, Trade, and Rights, 18 Am. U. Int’l L. Rev. 1399, 1410 (2002‐2003). 
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 Lawrence Summers is “in favor of all lateral reductions in trade barriers, whether they be 
multi, uni, bi, tri, plurilateral. Global liberalization may be best, but regional liberalization is very 
likely to be good.”30 He regards the debate about trade diversion proclivity of FTAs as 
inconsequential and “find it surprising that this issue is taken seriously-in most other situations, 
economists laugh off second best considerations and focus on direct impacts.”  31 This position 
drew a sharp reaction from Bhagwati and Panagariya who responded that:    
We may recall that, since Viner’s (1950) classic work, PTAs have been considered to be harmful 
both to member countries whose imports are the subject of the trade diversion and to the world 
under trade diversion and welfare-enhancing under trade creation. This ambiguity of outcomes, 
depending on the relative strengths of the two effects when a PTA is formed, has been the 
principal reason for the debate among economists as to whether a specific PTA is desirable.”32     
Robert Pahre a realist asserts that, “regionalism takes away an important motive for global 
negotiations such as a proposed new round of the WTO.” 33 Hudec and Southwick made a valid 
conclusion in 1999 which is still valid today: “The jury is still out on whether the proliferation of 
RTAs advances trade liberalization or allows for an increasingly tangled web of trade-distorting 
preferential regimes.”34   
II. Framework of GATT and FTAs 
A. The Most Favored Nation Clause 
                                                            
30Larry H. Summers, Regionalism and the World Trading System in , The WTO and Reciprocal   Preferential Trading 
Agreements,420,421(Caroline Freund ed., 2007). 
31 Id. at 425. 
32 J. Bhagwati and A. Panagariya, Preferential Trading Areas and Multilateralism: Strangers, Friends or Foes?, in The 
WTO  and Reciprocal Preferential Trading Agreements,93,100(Caroline Freund, ed., 2007). 
33 Robert Padre, Most‐Favored‐Nation Clauses and Clustered Negotiation, in The Rational Design of International 
Institutions, 129(Barbara Koremenos, Charles Lipson and Duncan Snidal, eds., 2004). 
34 Robert E. Hudec and James D. Southwick, Regionalism and WTO Rules: Problems in the Fine Art of Discriminating 
Fairly in Trade Rules in the Making: Challenges in Regional and Multilateral Negotiations, 47,79(Miguel Rodriguez 
Mendoza, Patrick Low and Barbara Kotschwar, eds., 1999). 
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The most favored nation (MFN) clause developed during the seventeenth century35 as a 
common practice of nations to insert in their trade treaties a commercial provision36 having the 
effect of present day MFN clauses. A conditional MFN was introduced by the American treaty 
with France on February 6, 1778 which set the United States apart from other nations until 1923 
when it adopted unconditional MFN.37 “Simply put, the MFN principle required that every trade 
advantage given to any country (GATT member or not) must be given, immediately and 
unconditionally, to every other GATT member.”38 The conditional MFN came back during the 
Tokyo Round in 1979 in the form of the Government Procurement Code, and the Subsidies Code 
in favor of developing countries which was strongly resisted by the United States.39  
The conditional MFN issue remained dormant for the rest of the 1980s. As the Uruguay Round 
moved toward its conclusion, however, some developed country governments once again began 
to speak about “free riders.” By the time of the Dunkel text” in December 1991, the issue had 
produced a radical demand that all GATT members sign all GATT texts, or else leave GATT 
altogether.40 
Marrakesh Morocco was the place where the Uruguay Round was concluded on April 15, 1994 
which led to the emergence of the World Trade Organization on January 1, 1995.41 
B. The Codification of Free Trade Areas under GATT 1947 
 The key exceptions to the MFN clause were retention of colonial preferences, formation 
of customs union and free trade areas.42 The genesis of the free trade area exception can be 
                                                            
35 Jacob Viner, Studies in the Theory of International Trade 63 (1965). 
36 See Viner, supra note 16, at 101. 
37 Id. 101‐102 
38 Robert E. Hudec, Enforcing International Trade Law: The Evolution of the Modern GATT Legal System 6 (1993). 
39 Id. at 121‐122. 
40 Id. at 123. 
41 See Lowenfeld, supra note 14 at 73. 
42 See Hudec, supra note 38 at 6. 
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traced to the following extract from a secret agreement between Canada and the United States of 
America.43  
 …deviation from the orthodox customs union…would not conform to that part of the 
definition of a customs union in Art. 42, par. 4 of the Charter and Art. XXIV, par. 4 of 
GATT which specifies that substantially the same tariffs and other regulations of 
commerce must be applied by each of the members to the trade of third countries.44  
The US employed subterfuge to support French amendments for Lebanese and Syrian demands 
for a modified custom union to introduce FTA exception.45 Article XXIV( 8) (a) of GATT 
provides that a customs union shall be understood to mean the substitution of a single customs 
territory for two or more customs territories, so that (i) duties and other restrictive regulations of 
commerce (except where necessary, those permitted under Articles XI-XV and XX) are 
eliminated with respect to substantially all the trade between the constituent territories of the 
union or at  least substantially all the trade in products originating from the territories.(ii) A 
common tariff must be applied by all constituent parts of the custom union to external trade. 
 Article XXIV (8) (b) of GATT provides that a free -trade area shall be understood to 
mean a group of two or more customs territories in which the duties and other restrictive 
regulations of commerce (except, where necessary, those permitted under Articles XI,46 XII,47 
XIII,48 XIV49, XV50 and XX51) are eliminated on substantially all the trade between the 
constituent territories in products originating in such territories. Free Trade Areas (FTAs) are 
                                                            
43 Kerry Chase, Multilateralism Compromised: the mysterious origins of GATT Article XXIV, 5 World Trade Review 1, 
1‐30(2006). 
44 Id. at 14. 
45 Id. at 14‐15. 
46 General elimination of quantitative restrictions. 
47 Restrictions to safeguard balance of payment  
48 Non‐discriminatory administration of quantitative restrictions. 
49 Exceptions to the rule of non‐discrimination.  
50 Foreign exchange arrangements with the International Monetary Fund. 
51 General exceptions. 
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relatively easier to establish, and with the failures of the Doha rounds of the WTO from 2001 to 
2008, over 400 FTAs are projected to be active by 2010. 
C. Domination of World Trade by the United States and the European Union   
  According to the constructive school of international relations the domineering influence 
of the United States within the world global trading system has been attained by  subtle 
projection of American values on the world community. This has been to create a world trading 
system in synchronization with the prevalent ideals of American trading interests. According to 
Ethan Kapstein:  
Just as individuals seek insurance or risk sharing mechanisms to tide them over when a crisis 
strikes, so states seek such devices in the form of military alliances, customs unions, and trade 
agreements and making it costly to escape from them, the insurance and or risk-sharing qualities 
are greatly enhanced.52 
The United States has utilized the mantras of fairness and justice to shield its trade interests and 
it becomes problematic when the United States has emerged as the sole super power and the 
largest economy in the world with a greater temptation to act unilaterally.53     
Gregory Shaffer in his construct succinctly appraised the overwhelming negative influence 
exerted by the European Union and the United States on developing countries in trade relations. 
According to him:    
The United States and EU are able to combine market power and their ability to forum-shift with 
vast material and informational resources that they deploy to their advantage in the drafting and 
application of WTO rules…As a result, the United States and EU have fashioned rules whereby 
they continue to protect and subsidize their domestic producers in the agricultural and textile 
sectors, while developing countries agreed to more costly commitments…The United States still 
applies an average tariff rate of 14 percent to goods from Bangladesh (primarily textile 
products), but only 1 percent to imports from France. In contrast, developing country 
                                                            
52 Ethan B. Kapstein, Power, fairness and the global, in Power in Global Governance 98 (Michael Barnett and 
Raymond Duvall eds., 2005). 
53 Id. at 100‐101.  (national 100 security 101). 
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implementation of the TRIPS Agreement is estimated to result in wealth transfers from 
developing countries to the United States of around $5.8 billion per year. 54     
       
According to Peter Rosendorff and Helen Milner of the realist school of international relations:  
The first instance of an antidumping law was Canada’s 1904 dumping regime. In 1947 the 
United States instituted the world’s safeguard clause…In the realm of safeguard clauses, for 
example, it is the United States that has the oldest laws and has been the most vocal proponent of 
them in international trade negotiations. U.S. trade law puts the escape clause into practice 
through   Section 201 of  the Trade Act of 1974…This practice has been followed closely in 
GATT largely at the United States’ insistence. Article XIX of GATT permits a member to escape 
from its obligations not to raise trade barriers when one of its industries is suffering an economic 
downturn and is experiencing “serious injury.”   In the realm of antidumping and countervailing 
duties the same association is apparent. U.S. and Canadian laws have preceded international ones 
and set the pattern for them. Article VI of GATT, and the Second Antidumping Code of the 
Tokyo Round, which define practice in antidumping and countervailing duty law, allows 
member states to apply duties when imports are sold at “less than fair value,” following U.S. 
practice.55                                                         
D.  United States Subsidies and West African Cotton 
 Cotton farming is the lifeline of ten million West Africans and comprises a sizeable 
chunk of export revenues of the non petroleum exporting countries in the region.56 It accounts 
for 90 percent of export revenues of Benin and the farming method and quality of ginnery ranks 
as the best in the world.57 Burkina Faso is one of the poorest countries in world and 2 million of 
its citizens dependent on cotton were threatened with starvation by United States cotton 
subsidies.58 A  World Trade Organization panel ruled in September 2004 that annual cotton 
subsidies of $3.2billion and $1.6billion in export subsidies paid by the United States had 
                                                            
54 Gregory Shaffer, Power, governance and the WTO, in Power in Global Governance 134 (Michael Barnett and 
Raymond Duvall eds., 2005).  
55 B. Peter Rosendorff and Helen V. Milner, The Optional Design of International Trade Institutions: Uncertainty 
and Escape, in The Rational Design of International Institutions, 83 (Barbara Koremenos, Charles Lipson and 
Duncan Snidal, eds., 2004). 
56 ICTSD, OXFAM and IDEAS Centre Dialogue, Geneva, Can Negotiations on Agriculture Deliver Pro‐Development 
Reforms? The Case of West African Cotton (June 17, 2003).  
57 Id. 
58 CIA, The World fact Book https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the‐world‐factbook/geos/uv.html (Last 
visited Mar. 22, 2009).  
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contravened WTO rules.59 The ruling was confirmed by the Appellate Body of the WTO on 
March 3, 2005.60 Brazil initiated the complaint in 2002, Benin and Chad both from West Africa, 
signed on as third parties. The chicken had come home to roost and United States’ strong 
tradition of compliance with WTO decisions has resulted in a gradual scale back of subsidies to 
its cotton farmers.61   
Do not forget either that the first agricultural waiver from GATT discipline was secured by the 
United States in 1955, effectively leading to the chaotic situation in agriculture today. The 
United States was also among the earliest countries to start restricting textile imports, initiating 
the descent down the road to the Multi-fibre Arrangement (MFA) that restricts and regulates 
exports of textiles and clothing from developing to developed countries.62                        
       
Millions of West Africans employed in their decimated textile industry, lost their jobs as a result 
of this factor.63   In 2005 at the Doha negotiation rounds of the WTO IN Hong Kong, the West 
African nations of Burkina Faso, Chad, Benin and Mali on behalf of thirty African producers of 
cotton advocated for a reduction of the high agricultural tariffs in the west.64  
In agriculture – a sector that was a late comer to rules of multilateral trade – and which lags some 
50 odd years behind the industrial, much of the developing world has placed its aspirations. The 
various forms of subsidies that the rich world had given to its producers, have crowded out 
                                                            
59 US Cotton Subsidies Declared Illegal by WTO, Again, Oxfam America, 
http://www.oxfamamerica.org/newsandpublications/press_releases/archive‐2005/wto_cotton_ruling (Last Visited 
Mar.21, 2009). 
60  United States –Subsidies on Upland Cotton WT/DS267/AB/R see full text at:  
http://docsonline.wto.org/GEN_highLightParent.asp?qu=%40meta%5FSymbol+%28WT%FCDS267%FC%2A%29+an
d+%28AB%29+and+not+%28RW%2A%29+and+%28%28+%40Doc%5FDate+%3E%3D+2005%2F01%2F01+00%3A00
%3A00+%29+and+%28+%40Doc%5FDate+%3C%3D+2005%2F12%2F31+23%3A59%3A59+%29%29&doc=D%3A%2F
DDFDOCUMENTS%2FT%2FWT%2FDS%2F267ABR%2EDOC%2EHTM&curdoc=3&popTitle=WT%2FDS267%2FAB%2F
R (Last visited Mar.2009) 
61 Elinor Lynn Heinisch, West Africa versus the United States on Cotton Subsidies: how, why and what next?, 
44,no.2 Journal of Modern African Studies 251,253(2006). 
62 Jagdish N. Bhagwati, United States Trade Policy at the Crossroads, 12 no.4 The World Economy,339,462‐
463(1989). 
63 World Bank Development Report 1998,  see full text at  http://www‐
wds.worldbank.org/external/default/WDSContentServer/IW3P/IB/1998/11/17/000178830_98111703550058/Ren
dered/PDF/multi0page.pdf (Last visited Mar.20, 2009). 
64 Pascal Lamy, WTO Director General , Opening Address, Twelfth Session of the Steering Committee –
Parliamentary Conference on the WTO June 22, 2006 http://www.wto.org/english/news_e/sppl_e/sppl30_e.htm 
(Last visited Mar.21,2009). 
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African and other farmers from international markets, putting the breaks (sic) on their 
agricultural trade…While the average tariff worldwide on industrial goods is only 5%, it is 60% 
on the agricultural. In launching the Doha Round, the developing world insisted that these 
imbalances be corrected, and has since been very active in the negotiations.65   
        Success at the Doha Rounds would eliminate the multibillion dollar farm subsidies in 
developed countries, which destroy investments of farmers and their livelihood in Africa.66 
“Developing countries now have lower tariffs for agricultural products than developed states 
and…are exposed to highly subsidized products entering their markets at price that undercut 
local producers.”67 The WTO Agreement on Agriculture came into force on January 1, 1995, and 
effectively retained a bound tariff of 60% on agriculture products for Europe and the United 
States.68 The United States started providing huge subsidies for its farmers during the “Great 
Depression in the 1930s. In Europe they began in the aftermath of the Second World War and 
with the establishment of the European Community.”69 Fairer WTO rules regulating agriculture 
subsidies and tariffs would dramatically improve the competitiveness of African agriculture and 
eliminate the reliance on imported food.70A successful Doha Round will improve income level 
of farmers in the developing world.71   
E.  TRIPS   
                                                            
65 Id. 
66 Jean‐Pierre Chaffour, Global Food Crisis: Trade Policy Origins and Options, Trade Note 34, World Bank 7(July 24, 
2008)   http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTRANETTRADE/Resources/239054‐
1126812419270/Trade_Note_34_Jul_24_08.pdf (Last visited Mar.22, 2009). 
67Penelope Simons, Binding the Hand that Feeds Them: The Agreement on Agriculture, Transnational Corporations 
and the Right to Adequate Food in Developing Countries, in Redefining Sovereignty in International Economic Law, 
399, 410 (Wenshua Shan, Penelope Simons and Dalvinder Singh, eds., 2008). 
68 Agreement on Agriculture, see full text at:  http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/14‐ag.pdf (Last visited 
Mar. 21, 2009). 
69 G. Edward Schuh, Developing country interests in WTO, In The Political Economy of International Trade Law: 
Essays Honour of Robert E. Hudec,435,436(Daniel L.M. Kennedy and James D. Southwick eds., 2002).  
70 World Bank, Global Economic Prospects 2009: Commodities at the Crossroads,13, see full text at: 
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTGEP2009/Resources/10363_WebPDF‐w47.pdf (Last visited Mar.22,2009).  
71 Id. at 97. 
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  Developing countries which had focused on development for half a century, either failed 
to understand the implications of incorporating patent and copyright protection into WTO’s 
binding obligations, or Article II (4) of the Agreement Establishing the World Trade 
Organization tied their hands.72 Put simply they had a choice to be bound under GATT 1947 
which dealt only with physical goods or sign up to GATT 1994 with its attached multilateral 
agreements on services, patents and copyrights  as one package.73 The United States had opted 
for GATT 1994 after the required six month notice, and most developing countries had to jump 
unto the same boat with the United States the largest trading economy in the world.74 “The 
problem is that there is no ground for a presumption that the TRIPS agreement will increase 
world economic welfare…”75 At a World Intellectual Property Organization meeting in 1987, 
Brazil, Cuba, France and India opposed the suggestion by the United States of including 
counterfeiting measures within GATT and felt such measures should be left to WIPO 
mechanism. The position of the intelligentsia in the United States during this era can be summed 
up as follows:        
Inclusion of an anti-counterfeiting code in the GATT would send a signal to infringing countries 
that the United States intends to take concrete action to help the motion picture and similar 
situated industries. It would also be a comparatively easy place for the United States to begin 
implementing a protective program because the GATT- and any code promulgated under it- 
deals with tangible goods, rather than more intangible efforts such as opening markets abroad 
and halting piracy.76                                   
It was the private lobby led by heads of Pfizer, IBM and the Motion Picture Association 
of America that prevailed on the Reagan administration and effectively won the heart and mind 
                                                            
72Brian Hindley, What Subjects are suitable for WTO agreements? In The Political Economy of International Trade 
Law: Essays in Honor of Robert E. Hudec, 157,158(Daniel L. M. Kennedy and James D. Southwick eds., 2002). 
73 Id. at 158. 
74 Id.  
75 Id. at 168.  
76 Jan D’Alessandro, A Trade‐Based Response to Intellectual Property Piracy: A Comprehensive Plan to Aid the 
Motion Picture Industry, 76G.L.J.460 (1987‐1988). 
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of the United States Trade Representative (USTR)77 to incorporate TRIPS into the WTO.78 The 
USTR is a cabinet level official and “the President’s principal trade advisor, negotiator and 
spokesperson on trade issues.” 79 These constellations of private interests persuaded the United 
States to join the Berne Convention which it had been very reluctant to join.80 The United States 
had to amend its law to join the Berne Convention in 1989, after a hundred years of the existence 
of the convention.81           
 The WTO structure hermetically locked out technological progress of developing 
countries through the Agreement on Trade- Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights 
(TRIPS).82 TRIPS came into force on January 1, 1996, but on January 1, 2006 in Least 
Developed Countries (LDCs).83 It is compulsory for any country that wants to join the WTO to 
also sign up to TRIPS.  “Reservations may not be entered in respect of any of the provisions of 
this Agreement without the consent of the other Members.”84  There is The Doha Ministerial 
Declaration of 2001 which permit countries to utilize compulsory licensing to produce generics 
of expensive patented drugs, to guarantee the health of their citizens.85 East Asian phenomenal 
development process imported technical knowhow86when intellectual properties rights had not 
                                                            
77 Susan Sell, Private Power, Public Law: The Globalization of Intellectual Property Rights, 75‐95(2003). 
78 Id. at 96‐120. 
79 Senate Approves USTR Designee Ron Kirk, Mar. 18, 2009, 
http://www.ustr.gov/assets/Document_Library/Press_Releases/2009/March/asset_upload_file828_15429.pdf 
(Last visited Mar. 22, 2009). 
80 Kevin Garnett, Gillian Davies and Gwilym Harbottle, Copinger and Skone James on Copyright, 1164, (2005).  
81 Robert P. Merges, Peter S. Menell and Mark Lemley, Intellectual Property in the New Technological Age, 
387(2007). 
82  See the full text of the Agreement at: http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/27‐trips.pdf (Last visited 
Mar.21, 2009). 
83 Id. 
84 Id. art. 72. 
85 Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health Adopted on November 14, 2001, 
http://www.wto.org/english/theWTO_e/minist_e/min01_e/mindecl_trips_e.pdf (Last visited Mar.21, 2009).  
86 World Bank Development Report 1998, 32,  see full text at  http://www‐
wds.worldbank.org/external/default/WDSContentServer/IW3P/IB/1998/11/17/000178830_98111703550058/Ren
dered/PDF/multi0page.pdf (Last visited Mar.20, 2009). 
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been locked up by TRIPS87          
 Evidence exist of “misguided protection in the transfer of textile technology to certain 
African countries.”88  The Chinese, Indians and Koreans émigrés workers and researchers in 
western technology firms, bridged such hurdles through the appeal and support of their countries 
to repatriate crosscutting technologies home as either as investors or as representatives of foreign 
investors.89 Former British colonies in West Africa like Ghana, Nigeria90 and Sierra Leone have 
always had robust laws securing trademarks, copyright and patents91 and have failed to attract 
the high levels of foreign direct investments of East Asia where similar laws were lacking until 
TRIPS came into effect in 1996.92 Srinivasan has established that, developing countries by 
agreeing to TRIPS, have incurred huge costs and the concessions promised by developed 
countries have not been met.93 “Reciprocal concessions proposed by the United States included a 
commitment to pursue reductions in EC agricultural subsidies, and a commitment to pursue 
reductions in textile quotas and to alleviate restrictions on the importation of tropical 
products.”94 These American carrots were coupled with the big stick of Section 301 actions and 
a threat to “abandon the GATT altogether, if its negotiating agenda was not accepted.”95     
1. Special and Differential Treatment (S&D) 
                                                            
87 Id. at 33. 
88 Id. at 31. 
89 Id. 
90 Egerton Uvieghara, Copyright Protection in Nigeria‐ New Trends and Prospects, in Nigeria’s Foreign Investment 
Laws and Intellectual Property Rights, 158‐162(Bankole Sodipo and Bunmi Fagbemi  eds., 1994); Bankole Sodipo, 
Piracy and Counterfeiting: GATTS, TRIPS and Developing Countries, 68‐69(1997). 
91 Keith E. Maskus, Intellectual Property Rights in the Global Economy, 102‐103 (2000) 
92 Id. at 199; see also Ikeochi Mgbeoji, TRIPS and TRIPS‐Plus Impacts In Africa, in Intellectual Property, Trade and 
Development: Strategies to Optimize Economic Development in a TRIPS‐Plus Era, 259,278(Daniel J. Gervais 
ed.,2007). 
93 T.N. Srinivasan, The Trips Agreement, in The Political Economy of International Trade Law: Essays in Honor of 
Robert E. Hudec, 343‐347(Daniel L.M. Kennedy and James D. Southwick eds., 2002). 
94 Frederick M. Abbott, The TRIPS‐legality of measures taken to address public health crisis: Responding to USTR‐
State‐industry positions that undermine the WTO, in the Political Economy of International Trade: Essays in Honor 
of Robert E. Hudec, 311,314(Daniel L.M. Kennedy and James D. Southwick eds., 2002). 
95 Id. 
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The developing countries which became independent in the 1950s pressurized GATT 
during its review session of 1954 to 1955 to redraft Article XVIII to protect their fledging infant 
domestic industries to enable competition on fair terms with industrialized countries.96 The 
cascade of newly independent states in the early 1960s led to the formation of the developing 
countries dominated  United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD)in 1964 
as a rival to GATT; which influenced GATT to add a new Part IV entitled ‘Trade and 
Development.97 The Committee on Trade and Development (CTD) was set up by members of 
GATT to administer Part IV; and from 1966 to 1971, CTD granted waivers for Australia’s tariff 
preferences to developing countries for certain products, the developed countries’ General 
System of Preferences (GSP) schemes in favor of developing countries, and lastly the waiver for 
the Protocol for Trade Negotiations among sixteen developing countries.98  
To have a secure legal basis for the granting of preferences to and among developing countries, 
the CONTRACTING PARTIES adopted the ‘Enabling Clause’ during the Tokyo Round of 
Trade Negotiations. The clause is important as it placed the concept of S & D treatment at the 
heart of the GATT legal system.99  
On June 15, 1999 the WTO granted least developed countries (LDCs)   a waiver from Article I 
paragraph I of GATT up till June 30, 2009 to enjoy preferential treatment.100  
2. African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) and European Union (EU)    
 France and Belgium in 1957 joined the European Community (EC) on the condition that 
their former colonies should be coupled with the EC.101 This led to the drafting of Lome I in 
1975, out of the Rome Treaty and the 1963 Yaoundé Convention between the European Union 
                                                            
96 Edwini Kessie, The Legal Status of Special and Differential Treatment, in WTO Law and Developing Countries 
17(George A. Bermann and Petros C. Mavroidis, eds., 2007). 
97 Id. at 18. 
98Id. at  18. 
99 Id. at 18. 
100 WTO Preferential Tariff Treatment for Least‐Developed Countries, see full text at: 
http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/waiver1999_e.pdf (Last visited Mar. 22, 2009). 
101 Carl B. Greenidge, Return to Colonialism? The New Orientation of European Development Assistance, in New 
Perspectives on European Union Development Cooperation 103(Marjorie Lister, ed., 1999). 
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and its former colonies in Africa, the Caribbean and the Pacific (ACP).102  The EU-ACP 
arrangement offered S&D treatment and was followed by Lome II in 1979, Lome III in 1984 and 
Lome IV in 1989. From 1970 to 1993 ACP exports to Europe fell from 8.9 per cent to 3.1 per 
cent and the ACP economies “have undergone precipitous declines.”103 The position of the EU 
on FTAs during the Uruguay Rounds in its Trade Policy Review of 1991 was: 
The Community’s basic attitude in favor of the multilateral trade system has, of course since the 
inception of the GATT, existed hand-in-hand with its enthusiastic support for and active 
involvement in free trade arrangements of a regional character…For the Community there is 
indeed no contradiction between these two positions. We have always believed that regional 
trade arrangements complement the multilateral system and represent an intermediate step 
towards the ideal of trade that is free of all customs duties and import restrictions among all 
nations. Progress on a more limited, regional basis among countries with homogenous economies 
and with close links in the geographical sense, may be the best achievable in the medium 
term.104  
Trade between the first twelve members of the EU from 1958 to 1990 increased from 35 per cent 
to 59 per cent while trade with most other countries fell and “the steepest decline was that of 
ACP countries.105 EU’s technical assistance to increase West African beef production was 
undermined by EU beef exports to West Africa, while sugar refineries in ACP countries financed 
by the EU got decimated by EU sugar exports.106 The EU-ACP in response to WTO rules107 and 
the “Bananas Wars”108 which divided Europe109 came up with the Cotonou Agreement of 2000 
                                                            
102 Id. at 103‐104. 
103 Id. at 106. 
104 Reproduced in Martin Wolf, The Resistible Approach of Fortress Europe 23 (1994). 
105 Id. at 26. 
106 Kunibert Raffer, Lome or Not Lome: The Future of European‐ACP Cooperation, in New Perspectives on 
European Union Development Cooperation 135 (Marjorie Lister ed., 1999). 
107 The Enabling Clause under WTO does not permit preferential regional trade arrangements between developed 
and developing countries, developed countries must extend the same treatment to all developing countries, 
except least developed countries which must also be treated alike. Developed countries dispense preferential 
treatment to developing countries if they so wish to do.   See also Jeanne J. Grimmett, Trade Preferences for 
Developing Countries and the WTO: CRS Report for Congress (2007) 
http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/crs/rs22183.pdf (Last visited Feb. 20, 2009). 
108 Raj Bhala, International Trade Law: Interdisciplinary Theory and Practice 1297(2008). 
109 Germany in particular had no ties with ACP countries exporting banana to Europe and preferred cheaper 
bananas produced by Chiquita the American multinational firms with huge operations in non ACP States in Latin 
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with twenty year life span.110 The Agreement is subject to review every five years and was 
signed at Luxembourg on June 25, 2005.111 The EU has slightly modified its multilayered and 
complex relationships with developing countries carved up into different geo-political regions.   
Six EU Partnership Agreements (EPAs) have been concluded and four EPAs were to have come 
into effect in four African economic regions on January 1, 2008.112 Central Africa, East Africa, 
Southern African Development Community and ECOWAS comprise the four regions which till 
date have made little progress with the EPA arrangement.113  The focus of this paper, 
ECOWAS,114has had its EPA stalled due to the refusal of Nigeria to sign up because  Europe did 
not provide access to its market.115 This raises the question once again whether the objectives of 
the EPA were well thought out. 
The objective of economic and trade cooperation is to promote the integration of the ACP 
countries into the global economy, by enhancing production and the capacity to attract 
investment, and ensuring conformity with WTO provisions, whilst taking account of respective 
developmental constraints…The ACP-EC Agreement aims to support the mutually reinforcing 
effects of economic and trade cooperation and development aid.116    
                                                                                                                                                                                               
America. See Scott Barfield, Multilateral Agreement on an EU Banana Trade Regime‐Political Compromise 
http://www.acp‐eu‐trade.org/library/files/Barfield_EN_072002_multilateral‐agreement‐on‐an‐EU‐banana‐trade‐
regime.pdf  (Last visited Feb.20, 2009); For a Constitutional Court Ruling in Germany on the Banana dispute see 
Miriam Aziz, Sovereignty Lost, Sovereignty Regained? The European Integration Project and the 
Bundesverfassungsgericht http://www.iue.it/RSCAS/WP‐Texts/01_31.pdf (last visited Feb. 21, 2009).  
110 Nsongurua J. Udombana, Back to Basics: The ACP‐EU Cotonou Trade Agreement and Challenges for the African 
Union, 40 TEX. INT’l. L.J.59, 59‐111 (2004). 
111 ACP‐EU Joint Parliamentary Assembly, ACP‐EU/100.203/08/fin. 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/intcoop/acp/60_15/pdf/re_integration_en.pdf (Last visited Feb. 21, 2009). 
112 African Union, Economic Partnership Agreements, http://www.africa‐
union.org/root/AU/AUC/Departments/TI/EPA/epa.htm (Last visited Feb.21, 2009).  
113 Lionel Fontagne, Cristina Mitaritonna and David Laborde, An Impact Study of the EU‐ACP Economic Partnership 
Agreements (EPAs) in the Six ACP Regions 16 (2008) 
http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2008/march/tradoc_138081.pdf (Last visited Feb.22, 2009). 
114Olumuyiwa B. Alaba, EU‐ECOWAS EPA: Regional Integration, Trade Facilitation and Development in West Africa,  
https://www.gtap.agecon.purdue.edu/resources/download/2599.pdf (Last visited Feb.22, 2009). 
115 Why Nigeria Refused to Sign EPA‐ECOWAS, http://www.bilaterals.org/article.php3?id_article=12628 (Last 
visited Feb. 22, 2009). 
116 Partnership Agreement ACP‐EC, 
http://ec.europa.eu/development/icenter/repository/Cotonou_EN_2006_en.pdf  (Last visited Feb.24, 2009). 
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Maybe the emphasis should have been on the elimination of numerous subsidies in Europe which 
debar imports from West Africa to enable real development to occur.117 
III.   Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS)  
This section traces the formation of ECOWAS and its evolution between 1975 and 2009. The 
goals of ECOWAS are appraised against the backdrop of economic difficulties, diverse legal 
systems, wars and political instability in West Africa. An evaluation of the ECOWAS Treaty is 
carried out together with the additional protocols which were formulated to cope with subsequent 
challenging circumstances in West Africa. This process helps in arriving at a performance 
scorecard.   
A. The Formation of ECOWAS  
The first annual report of the Economic Commission for Africa (ECA) expressed concern 
about the “economic groupings in Europe on African economies” and mandated its Executive 
Secretary to: 
…study and appraise the effects of economic groupings in Europe on industrialization in  Africa, 
intra-African trade and Africa’s economic development in general, and to recommend measures 
necessary to offset any prejudicial effects of such economic groupings…” 118 
In response to regional groupings in Europe, the ECA commissioned sub regional studies 
throughout Africa and concluded that Africa’s development would be enhanced by sub-regional 
groupings.119 “The emphasis on regional groupings, however, did not mean that the various sub-
regions were to be self-contained units. The goal should be an African common market 
                                                            
117 Department for International Development, Economic Partnership Agreements: Making EPAs Deliver for 
Development, http://www.dfid.gov.uk/aboutdfid/organisation/ukpolicy‐epas.pdf (Last visited Feb. 22, 2009). 
118 Economic Commission for Africa Annual Report 17(1960) 
119 Economic Commission for Africa Annual Report 10‐1 (1962). 
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embracing all countries of the continent.”120        
  Concrete steps to form ECOWAS commenced at a Conference on Economic 
Cooperation in West Africa, held by eleven West African States in Niamey, Niger Republic in 
October 1966.121 This was followed by another conference held in Ghana in 1967 which adopted 
Articles of Association122 presented by the ECA executive secretary, Robert Gardiner. He noted 
that “branches of economic activities are closed to majority of West African countries due to 
their small economic size.”123  Fifteen West African states concluded the ECOWAS treaty from 
27 to 28 May 1975 in Lagos, Nigeria and at Lome, Togo in November 1976; five protocols to the 
ECOWAS treaty were signed.124 ECOWAS has fifteen members made up of Benin, Burkina 
Faso, Cape Verde, Cote D’Ivoire, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea Bissau, Liberia, Mali, Niger, 
Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone and Togo.125 These are former British, French and Portuguese 
colonies with disparate legal systems modeled on civil law and the common law greatly modified 
by autochthonous circumstances.    
1. Objectives of ECOWAS 
ECOWAS treaty of May 28, 1978 was revised at Cotonou on July 24 1993.126The aims 
of ECOWAS are to promote co-operation and integration leading to the establishment of a 
customs union in West Africa in order to raise the living standards of its peoples and to maintain 
enhanced economic stability, foster relations among its members while contributing to the 
                                                            
120 Economic Commission for Africa Annual Report 25(1964). 
121 S.K.B. Asante, The Political Economy of Regionalism in Africa: A Decade of the Economic Community of West 
African States 50 (1986). 
122 Formulated at the October 1966 Niamey Conference. 
123 See Asante; supra note 119, at 51.  
124 Id. at 57. 
125 ECOWAS Member States, http://www.ecowas.int/ (Last visited Feb. 22, 2009).  
126 See ECOWAS Treaty, July 24, 1993, available at   
http://www.comm.ecowas.int/sec/index.php?id=treaty&lang=en (Last visited Feb.22, 2009). 
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progress and development of West Africa. 127 To achieve these objectives  ECOWAS has sought 
the harmonization and  co-ordination of national policies through integration programmes in 
agriculture, industry, transport, communications, energy, trade, finance, taxation, law 
reform.128It attempts to harmonize and coordinate regional policies to protect the 
environment.129 The attempt to set up joint venture production enterprises has not been 
attained.130  ECOWAS has sought to liberalize trade among its members through the 
abolition of import and export duties as well as the elimination of non-tariff barriers in West 
Africa.131 Very strict rules of origin have eliminated a large number of industries from 
intraregional trade.132 Nigeria accounts for 75 percent of ECOWAS exports and 45 percent of its 
imports and if Nigeria is excluded intraregional trade rises to 20 percent.133 Burkina Faso, Niger 
and Mali which are landlocked have a higher level of intraregional trade.134  Bhagwati asserts 
that rules of origin make a mess of international division of labor in a global age.135  Goods 
produced in free trade zones or export processing zones shall in no case be considered as goods 
emanating from ECOWAS members.136 The goal of a common external tariff and a common 
trade policy vis-à-vis third countries137 has not been realised. Free movement of persons, goods, 
                                                            
127 Id. art. 3(1).  
128 Id. art 3(2)(a). 
129 Id. art. 3(2) (b). 
130 Id. art. 3(2)(c). 
131 Id. art. 3(2)(d)(i). 
132Trade and Development Report 2007 , United Nations Conference on Trade and Development , 100 full text 
available at:  http://www.unctad.org/en/docs/tdr2007_en.pdf (Last visited Mar.21,2009). 
133 Id. 
134 Id. 
135 The Global Age: From a Skeptical South to a Fearful North, 7th Raul Prebisch Lecture, April 1996, United Nations 
Conference on International Trade and Development, 28 full text available at 
http://www.unctad.org/en/docs/prebisch7th_bhagwati_en.pdf (Last visited Mar.21, 2009). 
136 Protocol Relating to the Definition of the Concept of Products Originating From Member States of the Economic 
Community of West African States, May 2002, available at  
http://www.comm.ecowas.int/sec/en/protocoles/Protocol_relating_to_the_definition_of_products050402.pdf 
(Last visited Feb. 22, 2009).  
137 ECOWAS Treaty, supra note 126, art. 3(2)(d)(ii). 
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services, capital and right of residence have been realised by ECOWAS, 138with the attainment 
of its phased implementation.139   
2.    Institutions of ECOWAS 
The following institutions have been instrumental in the achievement of the objectives of 
ECOWAS; the Authority of Heads of State and Government,140 Council of Ministers,141 
Community Parliament,142 Economic and Social Council,143 Court of Justice,144 and the 
Executive Secretariat145 now known as the Commission. ECOWAS also established the 
ECOWAS FUND for Cooperation, Compensation and Development (ECOWAS Fund) in its 
treaty146 and the ECOWAS Fund became operational in 1979.147  
In order to enhance the financial resources of the Fund through the opening to non-regional 
partners, the Authority of Heads of State and Government at its twenty-second session held on 9 
and 10 December 1999 decided to transform ECOWAS Fund into a regional holding company 
called ECOWAS Bank for Investment and Development (EBID) with two specialized 
subsidiaries, ECOWAS Regional Development Fund (ERDF) and ECOWAS Regional 
Investment Bank (ERIB). The EBID Group became operational in 2003.148  
ECOWAS Parliament came into existence in 2001 and the second legislature was inaugurated in 
November 2006 with 115 seats divided amongst its members based on population size.149 
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Nigeria has the highest number of thirty-five seats while Cape Verde, Gambia and Togo have 
five seats each.150   
B. Trade Creation and a Common Market 
ECOWAS accounts for half of the total ACP exports into Europe which comprise mainly 
of raw agricultural products.151 The abolition of tariff on European imports under the EU-ACP 
EPAs will lead to a 70 per cent loss of tariff revenues by ACP countries and West Africa will be 
the most affected region.152 This might be compounded by the current global crisis rocking the 
European Union. “The asymmetric nature of international trade and financial relations is such 
that any change in performance in the industrialized countries is amplified in its effects on the 
developing economies.”153 ECOWAS needs to increase trade growth through greater integration 
which spurs investment.154 The Economic Commission for Africa observed in 1996 that   
Integration presupposes development of transportation and communication linkages as well as 
“investment in human resources.”155 This was similar to its findings in 1961 in a study on 
transport problems in West Africa in relation to economic development which stressed: 
… the fact that hardly anywhere in Africa is there a fully integrated transport system permitting a 
rational mode of transport best suited to demand. Since existing transport systems were primarily 
developed to serve foreign trade, there is a marked lack of services catering for domestic 
markets.156  
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1. Trade Barriers 
ECOWAS comprises of a potpourri of Francophone, Anglophone and Lusophone legal 
systems modified by autochthonous circumstances of its fifteen members which has hindered 
intraregional trade. “As a matter of fact very little work has been done in the area of 
harmonization of law among African countries.”157 The Francophone: Economic Community of 
the States of Central Africa (CEEAC), Comite Permanent Consultatif du Maghreb (CPCM), 
Central African Common Market (UDEAC) and the Anglophone East African Common Market 
were adversely affected by lack of harmonization of the laws of the component members.158  
“Admittedly the effect of the Economic Community of West Africa (ECOWAS) has been 
exceptional for regional economic organizations.”159          
 At a 1960 London conference of the British Commonwealth on the future of law in 
Africa, the challenge was how to synthesize numerous indigenous legal systems with various 
strands of the common law bequeathed by Britain on its former colonies.160 “The harmonization 
of trade laws and commercial practices is an important ingredient of regional integration, without 
which meaningful economic integration cannot be achieved.”161 Other barriers to trade within 
the ECOWAS region consist of poorly maintained road networks and insufficient penetration of 
rural areas where most agricultural production takes place.162 A border crossing in Africa is 
equivalent to the cost of 1000 miles of inland travel in Africa and 100 miles of travel in 
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Europe.163The economies of most states are small in size.164  Ghana, Cote D’Ivoire and Nigeria 
are the few exceptions. Multiple currencies and varying exchange rates also hinder commerce 
within ECOWAS while telecommunications used to be a major problem until a few years 
ago.165The major problems remain transiting by road across West Africa through numerous road 
blocks manned by numerous uncoordinated agencies in each country. “There is no doubt… that 
the continuing use of roadblocks constitutes a serious hindrance to the development of Intraunion 
trade.”166   
International trade within West Africa is relatively little developed because countries of the 
region are not economically complementary in any marked degree; their structures of demand 
and production are not such that they can provide important markets and sources of supply for 
one another…But as yet exporting capacity even in manufactures, continues to be more readily 
absorbed overseas than in neighbouring countries.167 
Trade in agricultural produce amongst ECOWAS citizens dating back centuries, prior to colonial 
rule has occurred across artificial colonial borders, oblivious of ECOWAS trade rules, “in 
disregard of law.”168 Citizens are obviously ahead of their leaders and bureaucrats in forging 
ahead with intraregional commerce. The period from 1973 to 1993 witnessed the same volume 
of intraregional trade within ECOWAS, showing that the formation of ECOWAS in 1975 did not 
create more trade during the first eighteen years of its existence.169  Rice, corn, sorghum, millet, 
palm oil, groundnut oil, livestock and yams as well as petroleum formed the bulk of trade during 
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this period.170 Manufactured goods were marginal in volume and Europe supplied the bulk of 
imports of manufactured goods mimicking the colonial template which discouraged intraregional 
trade and local manufacturing. 171 External tariffs have fallen considerably in West Africa but 
volume intra regional trade has not surpassed the ten percent peak attained in 1980.172   
C. Challenges Faced By ECOWAS 
In the 1980s when African countries were in financial crisis, the World Bank and the 
International Monetary Fund administered a structural adjustment program that mandated 
African countries to eliminate public spending on health and education; to balance their budgets 
so as to qualify for loans to repay outstanding interest payments on loans sourced from western 
private banks. The same prescription was administered upon every African country with varying 
and different economic ailments. Elimination of public spending and scrapping of subsidies was 
the solution to reviving African economies. West African countries were directed to eliminate 
public spending on transport, roads, power and steel projects as well as communication, 
university education and research.  The SAP therapies destroyed public infrastructure and led to 
massive decay of educational and health facilities173 and electricity power projects collapsed and 
drove manufacturing enterprises from Africa to Europe and emerging economies of Asia. These 
therapies have assumed the umbrella term, “Washington Consensus”.174 “Many subsidiaries of 
French Banks went bankrupt in West Africa…forty-three of 139 British firms with industrial 
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investments in Africa withdrew primarily from Nigeria, Zimbabwe and Kenya.”175  
 There has been a palpable disconnect between ECOWAS and ordinary citizens as well as 
the organized business sector.176 Ironically it was the efforts of ECOWAS in peace enforcement 
in Cote D’Ivoire, Liberia and Sierra Leone that brought it into public consciousness. Africa 
experienced in the past two decades the most horrific nature of human misery wrought by armed 
conflicts in Angola, Burundi, Democratic Republic of Congo, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Mozambique, 
Rwanda, Somalia, Uganda, and in West Africa, Cote D’Ivoire, Liberia and Sierra Leone.177 
Liberia lost 250,000 and Sierra Leone, 75, 000 of its most precious resource, human capital.178 
On August 7, 1990, ECOWAS established the ECOWAS Cease-Fire Monitoring Group 
(ECOMOG) to stop the Liberian civil war which started in 1989 and was destabilizing the West 
African sub-region.179 The United Nations Security Council gave a retroactive approval to the 
actions of ECOMOG under Chapter VII provisions of the United Nations Charter.180   
  On August 30, 1997, in Abuja the Nigerian capital, the twentieth summit of ECOWAS 
deployed ECOMOG to stop the Sierra Leonean civil war and “restore the democratically elected 
government of Tejan Kabbah.181 ECOWAS during this period was also trying to sustain its less 
than one per cent share of world trade and a very low level of intra-ECOWAS trade. 182 The 
above civil wars strained the limited financial resources of ECOWAS countries and the region is 
still recovering from the devastation wrought on the economies of battle theatres and their 
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neighbouring countries. Political instability is still a recurring decimal in West Africa and it has a 
very negative effect on the economies of ECOWAS. In January 2009, Guinea was suspended 
from ECOWAS pursuant to ECOWAS 2001 Protocol on Democracy and Good Governance after 
the army assumed power.183   The assassination on March 2, 2009 of the President of Guinea 
Bissau brought this sad element to the fore again.184The Chairman of ECOWAS strongly 
condemned the murder and ECOWAS initiated efforts to entrench democracy in Guinea 
Bissau.185 In March 2009, the ECOWAS President, Dr Chambas observed that: 
For more than thirty years, ECOWAS has led this regional approach to economic 
development …While some progress has been recorded, it is clear that not only does West Africa 
remain poor and undeveloped, but regional integration is not at the centre of the national 
development agenda; the potential of regionalism has not been properly explored and utilized. 
The development of the region requires much more attention and effort than has been 
forthcoming in the past.186 
This shows a chasm between national aspirations and regional integration in West Africa.  
Conclusion and Recommendations for Reform  
The WTO believes that there would be 400 FTAs existing in 2010, and the debate has 
shifted from whether they are trade creating or distorting to how to utilise FTAs to reduce trade 
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barriers within the WTO structure.187 TRIPs is a global manifestation of how “the US 
constitutional imperative of the ‘progress of Science and the useful Arts’, intended to benefit the 
public, has been sabotaged by private capital with organized access to the legislative process.” 
188    This becomes relevant following the collapse of the Doha round of multilateral trade talks 
in July 2008 and the rise of FTAs deals.189  The paper appraised the international economic law 
regime, through the establishment of ECOWAS in 1975 by fifteen contiguous states in West 
Africa, to promote inter-regional trade and remove all barriers to labor, capital and ultimately 
establish a single currency for its fifteen countries. An analysis was carried out on the 
implementation of the goals of ECOWAS, and the modification of its treaty through additional 
protocols; to guarantee, peace, security and democracy in West Africa as a sine qua non for 
engaging the global economic community in a symbiotic relationship. The paper concludes that 
ECOWAS has achieved peace and democracy in West Africa, despite limited resources, but its 
percentage share of world trade fell from 1.6 per cent in 1980 to 0.6 per cent in 2006, excluding 
oil exporting members. The paper observes that ECOWAS has a lot of homework to do in 
improving the quality of public infrastructure, access to credit by entrepreneurs, in order to 
promote regional trade and access to the global economy.       
  “Despite its numerous initiatives ECOWAS is still not an economic success.”190 It 
has evolved into an FTA as opposed to its ambitious goal of a customs union.191   It needs 
committed and visionary leadership on the part of ECOWAS Heads of State to judiciously apply 
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state resources to improve transportation, energy supply and unknot the mercantilist rules of 
origin hindering intraregional commerce in manufactured goods. This will unleash the 
entrepreneurial spirit of citizens of West Africa who had traded for centuries, before the Berlin 
Conference192 imposed boundaries upon time tested West African commerce. “One draws 
consolation from the fact that throughout Africa there is today a growing awareness of the need 
for meaningful economic integration at regional and sub-regional levels as the only way of 
solving the problems created by the division of the African continent into a number of 
economically non-viable States.”193      
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